This paper considers some political and ethical issues associated with the 'academic intellectual' who researches social movements. It identifies some of the 'lived contradictions' such a role encounters and analyses some approaches to addressing these contradictions. In general, it concerns the 'politico-ethical stance' of the academic intellectual in relation to social movements and, as such, references the
Introduction
This paper considers a type of 'intellectual': the 'academic intellectual' who researches social movements. It identifies some of the contradictions such a role encounters and contrasts some approaches to addressing these contradictions. The paper's goals are both specific and general. In general, it concerns the role of the 'academic intellectual' in relation to social movements. More specifically, the paper considers that role in relation to one political 'field' and one type of movement: a field which we refer to as 'psychopolitics' and a movement which, since the mid-to-late 1980s, has been known as the 'psychiatric survivor' movement.
The paper is structured in three parts. Part 1 sketches specifications of the paper's key concepts: psychopolitics, psychiatric survivors and academic intellectuals.
Part 2 outlines what, following Colin Barker and Laurence Cox (2002) , we call the 'lived contradictions' faced by academic intellectuals researching social movements.
Part 3 contrasts how these 'lived contradictions' are approached in two prominent texts specifically concerned with the psychiatric survivor movement: Nick Crossley's Contesting Psychiatry (2006a) and Kathryn Church's Forbidden Narratives (1995) .
We argue that Crossley demonstrates minimal engagement with these movements, whereas Church, by contrast, demonstrates a commitment which we regard as 'deeply engaged' (Tattersall, 2006) . Hence, the paper differentiates amongst academic intellectuals researching psychiatric survivors according to the depth of their engagement with the 'lived contradictions' such relationships entail.
Finally, the paper rejects a critique which may be levelled at the notion of the 'deeply engaged' academic -that in valorising 'engagement' above the more 3 academically-oriented values of 'objectivity', 'scientificity' etc., it succumbs to what may be called a 'tautology problem'. In other words, the argument in favour of 'deep engagement' appears logically circular and can, therefore, provide no independent criterion of evaluation external to the practices of 'engagement' itself (e.g. academic 'objectivity'). We conclude, however, that academia also, in its more minimally engaged manifestations, succumbs to its own form of circular logic -whilst the values of 'deep engagement', by contrast, are grounded, not in a logical tautology at all, but, rather, in the academic intellectual's experience of 'lived contradictions' and dialogic relations with social movements themselves.
Part 1: Psychopolitics, Psychiatric Survivors and Academic

Intellectuals
Psychopolitics
The term 'psychopolitics' was coined by Peter Sedgwick (1982) , a prominent member of the British New Left, to refer to a field of political action focused upon welfare institutions concerned with the governance of 'mental health'. Such institutions are sometimes critically characterised as the 'psy-disciplines' (Rose, 1985 , Parker et al., 1995 , which includes biomedical psychiatry but also numerous ancillary coinstitutions including: psychology, social work, nursing etc. Under conditions of advanced capitalism, the psy-disciplines have become a political 'field of contention' (Crossley, 2005a characterised by struggles over both identity-claims (e.g. the recognition of professional and patient identities) and the distribution of public resources (cf. Fraser, 1997) .
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Following Sedgwick, we call this field of contention psychopolitics and we understand activism within it in terms of heterogeneous political agents deploying resources of power and capital in sub-and adjacent fields. Examples of sub-fields include social movement organisations [SMOs] , professional bodies, 'third sector' charities etc., whilst adjacent fields incorporate the media, academia and the law. As academics who are engaged within the psychopolitical field, we are specifically interested in the relationship between SMOs (sub-field) and those academics (adjacent field) who actively conduct research upon them (SMOs).
Psychiatric Survivors
Our interest, then, is the relationship between psychopolitical SMOs and academics conducting research within this particular 'field of contention'. To this statement, we should add a qualification -for our interest in such SMOs is by no means objective; it is not primarily as an 'object' of social research that they have entered our view.
Rather, our interest is driven by what we have referred to elsewhere as a 'politicoethical stance' (Cresswell and Spandler, 2009, p. 143 ) -a stance typified by 'deep engagement' with SMOs in this field (see Tattersall, 2006) . Updating Sedgwick's (1982) seminal work, we argue for the transformation of psychiatry and its simultaneous democratisation via the formation of political alliances within and across the psychopolitical field (see Cresswell and Spandler, 2009 ). We focus upon psychopolitical SMOs because they have been and remain key agents of democratisation -whilst under the generic rubric of 'psychopolitical SMOs', we are particularly focussed upon alliances with self-defined 'psychiatric survivors': psychiatric patients' groups and their allies which emphasise the potentially iatrogenic 5 effects of treatment by the 'psy-disciplines' (see Breggin, 1992 , Campbell, 1992 , Pembroke, 1991 and, therefore, the need to campaign for alternative treatments and forms of support (see Spandler and Calton, 2009 ).
Academic Intellectuals
Any political field which penetrates 'social space' (see Bourdieu, 1989) as pervasively as psychopolitics simultaneously attracts the attention of Homo Academicus (Bourdieu, 1988) , an 'ideal type' (see Weber, 1949) we refer to in this paper as the 'academic intellectual'. In fact, psychopolitics and academia exist in a state of dynamic inter-relation. Under conditions of advanced capitalism, this relationship is manifest in at least three ways, by:
1. the credentialing by the state, via the cultural capital of academia, of those 'psy-experts' tasked with 'administering' the 'mentally ill' (i.e. the training of psychiatrists, psychologists, nurses, etc.); 2. the penetration of the psyche by the bio-technologies of the natural and social sciences whereby manifestations of human distress become pharmacologically pacified and/or psychologically 'managed' by clinical interventions designed according to a positivistic 'evidence base'; 3. the academic 'gaze' of the social sciences which takes the psychopolitical field -and survivor SMOs within it -as their 'object' of research.
As should be clear by now, it is this last relationship that is of particular interest to this paper. Whilst, in the generic terms of the 'academic gaze of the social sciences' there now exists a sub-field comprising 'Social Movement Studies' with its own 'institutional academic apparatus' (Barker and Cox, 2002, p. 1) , within that field, there is a growing focus upon survivor SMOs themselves as an 'object' of research (e.g. Crossley, 2006a , Emerick, 1996 , Everett 1994 , Morrison, 2005 In harmony with both this more specific critique and the generic critique of Cox et al, the strategy of this paper is one we would characterise as 'reflexive auto-critique' (see ........, 2009, p. 143) . This means that, rather than taking survivor SMOs themselves as our 'object' of research, we turn our gaze back, instead, upon the academic field itself and its relationship to social movements. To 'turn back' in this way invites recognition that the academic field functions according to a set of 'field specific' rules (see Bourdieu, Passeron and de Saint-Martin, 1994 ) -one of which appears to be a lack of reflexive auto-critique concerning its relationship with social movements. Given such an evident lack, it is not surprising, therefore, that reflexive work at the interface of the academic and psychopolitical fields should be so rarely attempted in a manner, say, analogous to Henry Giroux's (2009) recent analysis of the interaction of the academic and military fields. This paper is an attempt to address that lack. 
Intellectual 'Types'
Our point-of-departure is the aforementioned generic critique of Barker and Cox (2002) which builds upon Antonio Gramsci's (1971) theory of the 'intellectual'.
Gramsci contrasted two 'types' of intellectual: the 'traditional' and the 'organic', the former being characterised as the 'ivory tower' academic who defended the class status quo and the latter as the activist grassroots organiser whose 'role and function' was to construct a transformative historical 'bloc'. The typology was grounded in a Marxist theory of hegemony which continued to stress the primacy of class-based social relations. Barker and Cox, however, provide a revision of Gramsci (1971) in the sense that his classic contrast is now displaced from solely class-based relations onto the field of social movements. With this displacement effected, they may now contrast the academic ('traditional') intellectual, typified by the higher education 'knowledge-worker', with the movement intellectual, typified by Gramsci's 'organic' grassroots activist (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 301-311) . Thus, a subtle transformation occurs: Gramsci's 'traditional intellectual', in Barker and Cox's hands, becomes the 'academic intellectual' of social movements whilst the 'organic intellectual' becomes the 'activist' located within social movements -the 'movement intellectual'. This analysis, it would seem, is salutary and carries over, we think, term-forterm when applied to the heterogeneous field of psychopolitics. Thus Gramsci's 'organic intellectual' becomes the 'movement intellectual' and the 'movement intellectuals' of the psychiatric survivor movement may be identified as those activists who have played a leadership role within the movement itself. We may name just a few that are particularly salient for this paper: in the Canadian context, Pat 8 Capponi (e.g., 2003) and David Reville (e.g., 2005 ) and in the UK, the alreadymentioned activists of the Survivors History Group (SHG) such as Peter Campbell (e.g., 1992 ) and Louise Pembroke (e.g., 1991) 3 . These are the psychopolitical heirs of Gramsci's 'organic intellectual'.
Barker and Cox's contrast between the 'academic' and the 'movement'
intellectual highlights further distinctions of value. Academic intellectuals, they argue, tend to be singly located within the academic field, apprehending social movements from within academia, as 'objects' of research, 'to be observed, described and explained' -not to be engaged with as 'active processes that people…experience ' (2002, p. 4 Bourdieu, 1988 Bourdieu, , 1989 .
It is true that the 'movement intellectual' is also likely to be singly locatedbut, this time, within the movement itself, producing knowledge for it and within it, not about it and of it. For the movement intellectual, the movement is what they are a part of and what is a part of them. From within such a location, the movement is no sort of 'object'. Thus, the movement intellectual's theoretical work is formulated, not according to the abstract generalisations of the academic intellectual, but upon concrete 'case propositions' which analyse pragmatic proposals in practice.
Invariably, the movement intellectual's theoretical work is organised in response to two imperative questions: Which side are you on? and What is to be done? (Barker 9 and Cox, 2002 It is important to note that, as these contrasts represent 'ideal typifications' (see Weber, 1949 ), there will be exceptions which blur such distinctions. Let us identify two. First, Barker and Cox are themselves academic intellectuals who are doubly located within academia and social movements. Not only have they pursued a 'deep engagement' with social movements, but, significantly for this paper, they intentionally practice a mode of 'reflexive auto-critique'. It is for this reason that we would characterise them as exemplars of 'the engaged academic' for the generic field of social movements.
More specifically, it is important to note the recent rise, from the 1990s onwards, of the 'survivor academic' -a researcher (often, but not always, located within academia) who explicitly utilises their experience as a 'psychiatric survivor' in their intellectual work (e.g. Sweeney et al., 2008) . Like Barker and Cox, survivor academics, such as Peter Beresford (e.g., 2005 ) and Diana Rose (e.g., 2008) , are also doubly located insofar as they remain within the social movement field (e.g. within survivor SMOs) but also within academia.
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Although such exceptions theoretically demonstrate that '[a]lmost any empirical case will diverge from the pure type' (Parkin, 2002, p. 30) , we do not consider this to render Barker and Cox's distinctions merely heuristic. But it does highlight the specificity of the psychopolitical field and the fact that the sub-field of survivor SMOs, like the adjacent field of academia, is itself 'in movement'. More significantly, it highlights the necessity of making further distinctions between academic intellectuals if we are, indeed, to define an effective 'politico-ethical stance'
based upon an engagement with social movements.
For this reason, we next consider what we call, following Barker and Cox (2002) , the 'lived contradictions' that face academic intellectuals in their relationships with social movements. We will argue that confronting such 'lived contradictions' in a way that is 'deeply engaged' results in productive, yet, at the same time, problematic, 'unsettled relations' (see Bannerji et al., 1992) between academics and survivor SMOs. Indeed, we would suggest that embracing such 'unsettled relations' is a precondition for defining a 'politico-ethical stance' that is truly 'deeply engaged'.
Part 2:
The 'lived contradictions' of the academic intellectual
Pursuing the line of engagement of Barker and Cox, we share their 'sense of unease'
with the 'uncomfortable observation that academic work is…parasitic on social movements ' (2002, p.1) . As such, they are sceptical about the academic field itself.
They sum up their scepticism by concluding that academic intellectuals who research 12 'permanent tenure' etc. In particular, the potential for the 'engaged' academic to construct progressive alliances between academics, professionals and users of services is systematically neutered by the lure of just such prestige, a seduction which Russell Jacoby (1987) (and others) have so aptly denounced. Barker and Cox alert us to the expropriation of 'activist theory' -those concrete rather than abstract propositionswhich are then 'recolonised and becomes a source of new, "sexy"…research subjects whose purpose is to attract…funding and status ' (2002, p. 9) . Negotiating this contradiction poses a separate question:
• How does the academic intellectual live the contradiction between an engaged solidarity and the 'lures' of recuperation?
Experience or Theory?
This recuperation is, in its simplest sense, that posed by this pursuit of academic progression/survival. But it is also a recuperation by theory. We will be specifying this contradiction for the psychopolitical field but we should also point out that it signifies a generic intellectual tendency that E.P. Thompson (1978, p. 205 The main pitfall of 'theoretical imperialism' is historical amnesia. The academic intellectual must never forget that the dynamic of theory and experience is one which (Cox and Nilsen, 2007, p. 424) . On the back of this demand a final question emerges:
• How does the academic intellectual live the contradiction between an engagement with the movement's own theory and the 'amnesia' of 'theoretical imperialism'?
Here we have three 'lived contradictions' and three accompanying questions confronting the academic intellectual researching social movements. In the final section we consider how these contradictions were actually 'lived' in the work of two academics specifically conducting research in the psychopolitical field. We do so via the analysis of two contrasting texts. In contrasting these, we will be bearing in mind both the specificity of this particular field and the fact that we are making distinctions between academics according to the depth of their engagement with the contradictions outlined above. Wallace, 1985) is exceptionally named (Crossley, 2006a, p. 197; also pp. 194-198 All the same, he subordinates the 'stories' of his anonymous interviewees to an a priori theoretical task -specifically, the development of 'social movement theory' -which runs through the 'usual suspects' to alight on his very own version (e.g., Crossley, 2002 It is for the reason of this single location that the contradiction of experience and theory proves tangential for Crossley and is superseded, instead, by the contradictions of the academic field. Thus, the 'data' of 'movement intellectuals' 'stories' are subsumed beneath the sociologists classic concern with 'structure' and 'agency' for which anonymous activists become mere 'nodes' in the 'networks' of social structures (Crossley, 2006a, pp. 13-29; also 2007 . In the face of such theoretical sophistication perhaps it is churlish to say that, 'structures still don't take to the streets!' (see Dosse, 1998, pp. 115-117) , but whatever the academic credentials of Crossley's sociological work, the experience and theory of the movement intellectual is irretrievably lost.
This last pitfall, we think, is an ever-present for the academic who is only (Cox and Nilsen, 2007, p. 424) . It is to an exemplar of such dialogue that we finally turn.
Kathryn Church's Forbidden Narratives (1995)
Our second text is the Canadian academic Kathryn Church's Forbidden Narratives:
Critical Autobiography as Social Science (1995), a somewhat neglected book which was the culmination of her doctoral research undertaken in the late 1980s/early 1990s.
At first sight a comparison with Crossley would not appear to be in Church's favour, the former being the author of many 'high impact' papers and books (e.g., 2002, 2005b, 2006ab) whilst the latter's corpus contains a significant amount of 'grey literature' 12 (e.g., 1997). Indeed, Church characterises herself as a 'sociologist who resists Grand Theory' and 'a writer whose best stuff goes into e-mail'.
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It is, however, precisely such contrasts which are so revealing for our purposes here. This is because they are indicative of her depth of engagement. Church proves to be not only engaged with the movement itself, but, equally, deeply engaged with our lived contradictions.
With Forbidden Narratives, we commence the analysis at the point we left
Crossley's -with our third contradiction of experience and theory. This point-ofdeparture arises because Church's approach to lived contradiction emerges, in the first place, from her own experience -or, more specifically, from the distinctively feminist 19 mode of reflexive auto-critique which inspired it (see Bannerji et al., 1992) . For
Church recognised that what is essential in living a contradiction is precisely the fact that, although it may be experienced, a contradiction cannot be theoretically solved. This question was clarified through a process which she aptly referred to as 'coming-into-theory' (ibid.). But this was not just a process of coming-into 'any old' theory, for Church but, very precisely, a 'coming-into' feminist theory -a process that was experiential and did not exist only at the abstract level of theory. In fact,
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Church's response to the contradiction of theory/experience turned out to be Janusfaced -'coming-into' feminist theory forced her to 'look two ways' at once, both to theory and to experience, in a way which gave 'intellectual legitimacy to personal narrative and experiential knowledge' (ibid., p. 4,). Significantly, it was the emphasis 20 within feminist theory upon both reflexivity and critical agency that helped her 'get to grips' both with her own experience (e.g. of personal 'breakdown') and to recognise how this 'resonated with' the contrasting 'breakdowns' of psychiatric survivors (ibid., p. 45). Feminism thus provided Church with a theoretical 'vantage point' (ibid., p. 23) through which to engage with the movement.
Pursuing this feminist mode of reflexive auto-critique, Church acknowledged that survivors must not provide the 'experience' to which she would append the 'theory'. Coupled with her own deep engagement with movement intellectuals, this made her increasingly aware of the inequalities which lie at the heart of 'minimalistic' approaches to the academic intellectual's role:
[has] suffered from…effects of power inequalities…The most pervasive is the…injustice which results from the objectification of…human "subjects"…' (ibid., p. 41, emphasis added)
This recognition, in turn, provided her with a feminist rendition of the contradiction of 'agency' and 'object': 'I fully intended to be 'objective' about my work with psychiatric survivors but the realities of genuine engagement made it virtually impossible not to take up subjectivity' (ibid., p. 3 emphases added).
The reality of 'genuine engagement' presented itself in the form of a pressing 'demand' -not from the dictates of 'research governance', 'academic progression' etc. within academia, but personally from psychiatric survivors themselves. What survivors demanded from Church was not academic objectification but, on the contrary, 'a kind of participation: they wanted me to be personal' (ibid., emphasis It is in consequence of this relationship that Forbidden Narratives is 'up close and personal' in a way which finds little echo in Contesting Psychiatry. In contrast to Crossley, Church's engagement with psychiatric survivors was not primarily academic: it was 'politico-ethical' and it led, via a 'physical and emotional breakdown' (Church, 1995, p. 3) to an experiential and theoretical 'breakthrough' (ibid., p. 45) -to the process of 'coming-into' feminist theory.
We should be clear about our argument here. We are not suggesting that an experience of personal 'breakdown' is either a sufficient or a necessary condition of a 'politico-ethical stance' towards psychopolitical movements. Nevertheless, it still needs to be said that one of the most forbidden elements of Church's 'narrative' -her experience, as she says, of 'personal breakdown' -remains of significance as an example of both the experiential burdens inherent in the act of living through 'lived contradictions' and as an insight into that other 'forbidden narrative' which lies at the heart of psychopolitics: survivors own stigmatisation within the psychopolitical field.
Church's 'forbidden narrative' cannot, therefore, at the end of the day, be judged as identical with the experiences of psychiatric survivors for the very reason, as she herself concedes, that she never fully experienced the stigmatizing effects of that particular 'field of contention': ' [a]symmetries of power and privilege cushioned my fall and…separated me from the full extent of what is possible when, for whatever reasons, a life falls apart…I was never labelled, never admitted to hospital, never psychiatrically drugged, never given ECT.
14 I was able to pay for alternative health care (ibid., p. 69).
Ultimately, the value of Church's auto-critique resides in the manner in which it facilitated her 'coming-into-feminist-theory' in a way which did not objectify the movement, but enabled her to recognise the critical agency of movement intellectuals through the critical agency of her own 'deep engagement'. This recognition is expressed in the way that Forbidden Narratives represents survivor activists -for example, at a most basic level, in the way in which they are 'explicitly named': '[t] here are a number of people explicitly named in this text and I thank them for allowing this sometimes difficult exposure as a contribution to my intellectual project: two amazing psychiatric survivor leaders, Pat Capponi and David Reville…' (ibid., p. xv).
Here, the comparison with Crossley is significant. In contrast to Contesting Psychiatry, where an 'imperative of anonymity' is (mostly) observed, Church felt ethically bound to name her subjects of research 'explicitly'. For her, the strategy of 'naming and acknowledging others is important, particularly in the survivor movement' where 'there has been so little recognition…of people's labors' (ibid., p. Church resisted academic 'objectification', then, through the depth of her own engagement. Yet, the fact that such engagement is never easy or 'settled' is the final contradiction with which we want to engage. We think, ultimately, that 'deep engagement' equals 'unsettled relations'. 'Having a foot in both camps' -Church's 'double location' -provoked a series of these (ibid., pp. 73-94) but, again, in a Janusfaced way: both in the sense of her relationship with psychiatric survivors but also her relationship towards academia. Such 'unsettled relations' prove to be especially revealing in respect of our last 'lived contradiction'.
Doing 'activist research', being 'political from within academia' (ibid., p. 53, emphasis added), invokes questions of solidarity and recuperation. 'Coming-into' feminist theory may have afforded Church her theoretical breakthrough but it constituted, at one and the same time, an 'experiential burden'. We will briefly consider this 'burden': first, in terms of her relationship to academia, and, then, in terms of her relationship to the social movement.
First, Church was acutely aware that the 'lures' of recuperation threatened her solidarity with psychiatric survivors. Her refusal to 'play the academic game' by, for example, objectifying the movement though a series of 'high impact' peer-reviewed papers, meant that, although she successfully resisted these 'lures', she did not readily achieve academic progression. Church prioritized, instead, a series of campaigning pamphlets designed to promote the aims of the movement.
Second, by practicing a feminist mode of reflexive auto-critique, Church was forced to reconsider her own role 'as an "outsider" in relation to a movement comprised of people ('insiders') who have a history of oppression' (ibid., p. 3) and, in consequence, her own potential for 'inscribing…survivors into non-liberatory frameworks ' (ibid., p. 23 To which we would add that, for the engaged academic, 'taking responsibility' means living the contradictions that are part and parcel of the academic intellectual's role.
'Living the contradictions' requires that we are aware of them as contradictions and that we make politico-ethical choices as a result of this awareness. We cannot theoretically solve these 'lived contradictions' but we can refuse to 'sit on the fence'.
Whilst it is not the last word on the subject, Church's Forbidden Narratives remains both a salutary point-of-departure within the specific field of psychopolitics and an important generic critique of the relationship between academia and social movements.
Conclusion
In perusing advanced drafts of this paper the reservation has been raised by sceptical readers that, in valorising in the example of Church, the 'engaged' academic, we have been unwittingly guilty of falling into the trap of tautology. It is a substantial objection. This 'tautology-problem', so the argument goes, falls under the spell of its own circular logic: thus, the criterion of positive value for the academic intellectual To this we would make two replies. First, insofar as the question presupposes 27 its very own valorization -specifically, of 'objectivity' over 'engagement' -it tends itself towards a strategy of recuperation. The 'tautology-problem' holds out the false prospect of establishing an academic criterion by which social movement research might be judged. And, of course, we know very well the specific tautologies which accompany that judgment: academic research is valorised if it appears in 'highimpact' journals of peer-review. But what grounds that particular valorisation? Just the fact that they are high-impact journals of peer-review. Academia, thus, succumbs to its very own 'circular logic'. This, we think, is where the tautology-problem properly lies. Indeed, the tautologies of the academic intellectual constitutes, we would argue, another 'lived contradiction' which in an era of public sector 'cuts' and the increasing privatisation of higher education, the 'engaged academic' increasingly has to contend.
But this is not our main response. For we would deny that we have fallen under the spell of a circular logic at all. The reason is this. The 'lived contradictions' of the academic intellectual are not, at the end of the day, philosophical problems. To think that they are, and to attempt their resolution at the analytical level, is the modus operandi of 'theoretical imperialism' -turning what is essentially a problem of 'lived experience' into a philosophical problem. This is precisely what E.P. Thompson, in 'The Poverty of Theory', railed magisterially against. Rather, we would express the problem like this. The engaged academic tries to be 'deeply engaged'. And 'deep engagement', far from being a philosophical problem, is a human practice -a 'lived contradiction' involving all the 'unsettled relations' which are subsequently engaged.
A 'lived contradiction' is a 'lived experience' -and it is at the level of 'experience' that its 'evaluation' needs to be made. But, here, we should take care about words.
'Evaluation' at this juncture is in fact a misnomer which we would rather avoid. It is 28 as if an academic intellectual armed with a positivistic 'evidence-base' could produce a succinct rendition of what constitutes 'deep engagement' (or what its outcomes or impacts might be). We prefer the normative language of 'responsibility' and 'politicoethical stance' to define the role of the 'engaged academic'. And if, at this juncture, our sceptical reader was again to inquire about 'grounds', we could only say, 'You are absolutely correct' -nothing 'grounds' deep engagement precisely because it is a commitment to a dialogic relation which is future-directed, which anticipates the 'unsettled relations' to come. This, it seems to us, is the antithesis of tautology -it is, rather, contingency. And this means, we conclude, that, however it is to be 'valued', academic engagement is ultimately contingent upon a dialogic and future-directed relation, which can only be, in the manner of Church, an 'unsettled relation' with the movement itself.
